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THE DISRESPECTFULNESS OFWEIGHTED
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JOSEPH ADAMS
If we can save the lives of only one of multiple groups of people, we might
be inclined simply to save whichever group is largest. We may worry,
though, that automatically saving the largest group fails to take each save-
able individual sufficiently into account, offering some of these individuals
no chance at all of being rescued. Still wanting to give larger groups higher
chances of survival, we may then say that we ought to employ a propor-
tionally weighted lottery to determine which group to save. In this paper,
I argue that this would be a mistake. Given the most plausible way of
specifying it, the weighted-lottery view itself fails to treat each saveable in-
dividual with equal moral respect.
I
Greatest Number and Equal Chance. Suppose that we are faced
with multiple non-overlapping groups of people, the members of
which will all soon die if we do not assist them. Unfortunately, we
are only able to save one group. What ought we to do? Ought we to
automatically save the largest group? Or ought we to, for example,
leave it to chance which group we save?
The solution to this moral conundrum, the Numbers Problem,
might seem obvious:
Greatest Number. Numbers Problem agents ought to save the group
(or one of the groups) that they believe1 consists of the greatest number
of people, ceteris paribus.
Greatest Number is, however, controversial. John Taurek (1977,
pp. 306–8) attacks Greatest Number on the grounds that it endorses
1 Since the views I will discuss in this paper are intended to be action-guiding, they are all
specified in terms of agents’ beliefs about the number of people in each saveable group, not
the actual sizes of those groups.
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interpersonal moral aggregation: it endorses, as Iwao Hirose (2015,
p. 24) puts it, the ‘combination of different people’s morally rele-
vant factors into a [single] value’. According to Greatest Number,
Taurek claims, the combined moral value of the individuals in the
largest group is greater than the combined moral value of the indi-
viduals in a smaller group. This is why we ought to save the largest
group.2
Taurek argues that, by endorsing aggregation of this kind,
Greatest Number fails to respect the equal individual moral signifi-
cance of each saveable person. By automatically saving the largest
group, we treat each of its members as being more individually
significant than each of the members of a smaller group, thus failing
to show ‘equal concern and respect for each person’ (Taurek 1977,
p. 303).
While the force of Taurek’s objection is unclear, there is a sense in
which Greatest Number may not seem to respect each saveable per-
son’s individual moral significance. To see this, suppose, first, that
we must decide between saving a solitary individual and saving a
group of three individuals. Greatest Number, of course, tells us to
save the group of three. Now suppose that a second individual is
added to the first group, such that we must now decide between sav-
ing a group of two people and saving a group of three. Greatest
Number again tells us to simply save the group of three.
According to Greatest Number, then, the addition of a second
person to the first group makes no difference to what we ought to
do. But if this person is individually morally significant, we might
think, then they do make some difference to what we ought to do. In
this sense, Greatest Number may seem to fail to respect this person’s
individual moral significance.
Taurek infamously argues that the number of people in each
group does not matter at all. No matter how many people are in
each group, we ought to employ an equal-chance lottery to deter-
mine which group to save (Taurek 1977, p. 303). When faced with
two saveable groups, for example, we ought to simply toss a coin.
Call this view Equal Chance.
Equal Chance stands at the opposite extreme to Greatest Number:
where Greatest Number takes the number of people in each group to
2 Some philosophers (Hirose 2001; Kamm 1985; Kumar 2001) have argued, contra
Taurek, that Greatest Number can be derived without any endorsement of such
aggregation.
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be decisive with respect to which group we ought to save, Equal
Chance claims that it does not matter at all. And yet Equal Chance
seems guilty of the very failing we suggested Greatest Number may
be guilty of. As Frances Kamm (1993, pp. 101, 114–19) and
T. M. Scanlon (1998, pp. 232–3) argue, Equal Chance does not
seem to respect every saveable person’s individual moral signifi-
cance. Suppose, first, that we must decide which of two solitary indi-
viduals to save. Equal Chance tells us to toss a coin, offering each of
these individuals a 1=2 chance of rescue. Now suppose that a second
person is added to one of these saveable groups, such that we must
now decide between saving one person and saving a group of two
people. Equal Chance still tells us to toss a coin, offering each group
a 1=2 rescue chance.
According to Equal Chance, then, the addition of a second person
to one of the groups makes no difference to what we ought to do.
But if this person is individually morally significant, we might again
think, then they do make some difference to what we ought to do. In
this sense, Equal Chance seemingly fails to respect this person’s indi-
vidual moral significance.3,4
We might, then, say the following. Where Greatest Number gives
the number of people in each group too much weight, treating it as
decisive, Equal Chance does not give it enough weight. As such,
both Greatest Number and Equal Chance fail to respect every save-
able person’s individual moral significance.
II
Weighted Lottery. Seeking a compromise between Greatest Number
and Equal Chance, we might be attracted to this claim:
Weighted Lottery. Numbers Problem agents ought to employ a pro-
portionally weighted lottery to determine which group to save, ceteris
paribus.5
In a proportionally weighted lottery, each group is offered a survival
chance directly proportional to the relative size of that group. If we
3 Note that, since this reasoning centres on the moral significance of a single individual, it
does not beg the question against the Taurekian ‘individualist’ proponent of Equal Chance.
4 Though see Otsuka (2006, pp. 112–16) for a reply to this objection.
5 See, for example, Saunders (2009) for a defence of this claim.
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are faced with one solitary individual and a group of two, Weighted
Lottery tells us to give the single individual a 1/3 survival chance,
and the group of two a 2/3 chance.
Weighted Lottery may seem to constitute a happy medium be-
tween the extremes of Greatest Number and Equal Chance. It does
not give the numbers as much weight as Greatest Number: the num-
ber of people in each group is not decisive with respect to which
group we ought to save. But it gives the numbers more weight than
Equal Chance: larger groups are given higher chances of survival.
In this way, we might argue, Weighted Lottery avoids the problem
that afflicts Greatest Number and Equal Chance. We have suggested
that, if we are deciding between saving a solitary individual and sav-
ing a group of three, Greatest Number may fail to respect the indi-
vidual moral significance of a second person added to the first
group. But Weighted Lottery does seem to respect this additional
person’s moral significance, since it requires us to employ a new lot-
tery that takes this person into account.
If we are deciding which of two solitary individuals to save, mean-
while, Equal Chance seemingly fails to respect the individual moral
significance of a second person added to either group. Weighted
Lottery, on the other hand, appears to respect this additional per-
son’s moral significance, since it again requires us to employ a new
lottery that takes this person into account.
Weighted Lottery, therefore, may strike us as a promising com-
promise position. Everyone gets a chance of being saved, but larger
groups get higher chances.6 This, we might say, is how to respect the
individual moral significance of every saveable person. Perhaps it is
only by employing a proportionally weighted lottery that we treat
every saveable individual with equal moral respect.
In §iv, I will argue that, most plausibly specified, Weighted
Lottery does not in every case respect the equal individual moral sig-
nificance of saveable persons. To see how Weighted Lottery is most
plausibly specified, though, we must first compare it to a similar
view proposed by Jens Timmermann.
6 Ben Saunders highlights the attractiveness of this compromise when he writes that
weighted lotteries ‘reflect both considerations of fairness . . . and the good of saving more
people’ (2009, p. 290).
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III
Individualist Lottery and Practical Equivalence. Sympathetic to
Taurek’s objection to Greatest Number, Timmermann (2004,
p. 110) endorses this claim:
Individualist Lottery. Numbers Problem agents ought to employ an in-
dividualist lottery to determine which group to save, ceteris paribus.
Individualist lotteries are won not by a group, but by one individual.
Each saveable person is given an equal chance of winning the lottery.
Once the winner has been selected, the agent must save any other
members of that individual’s group as well.
Timmermann remarks that Individualist Lottery is ‘practically,
but not philosophically, equivalent’ to Weighted Lottery (2004,
p. 111). In fact, however, this practical equivalence depends on how
Weighted Lottery is specified with respect to particular cases of
changing information. In these cases, an agent has run a lottery that
they believe to have been correctly proportionally weighted, despite
now believing that, at the time of the lottery, they had failed to iden-
tify every saveable individual.
For instance, an agent believes that they can save one of two save-
able individuals, and tosses a coin to determine which to rescue. But
the agent subsequently realizes that both individuals are accompa-
nied by a second person who could be saved with them. When
the agent ran their initial coin-toss lottery, they had failed to identify
every saveable person, but their lottery offered each of the two pairs
a correctly proportioned chance of survival (1=2) anyway.
Individualist Lottery is practically equivalent to Weighted Lottery
only if, in these changing-information cases, Weighted Lottery
requires the agent to run a new lottery in response to their new infor-
mation, for it is clear that this is what Individualist Lottery requires.
If the agent has run an individualist lottery but failed to identify ev-
ery saveable individual, then their lottery will have failed to give
some individuals any chance of victory at all. And giving every indi-
vidual some chance of victory is, of course, precisely what
Individualist Lottery requires. Having discovered additional individ-
uals, therefore, the Individualist Lottery agent must run a new
lottery, taking these additional people into account.
So long as the agent’s initial lottery was correctly weighted,
though, Weighted Lottery most plausibly requires the agent to
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respect the result of that lottery. The intuition underwriting
Weighted Lottery is, after all, that offering each group a propor-
tional chance of survival is what matters. This intuition, it seems, is
what motivates the claim that it is a proportionally weighted lottery,
and not an individualist one, that is required. If it matters precisely
how many individuals are saveable, and not simply what proportion
of this number are in each group, then it is unclear why proportion-
ally weighted lotteries are ever sufficient, and why individualist lot-
teries are not always required instead.
If offering each group a proportional survival chance is what mat-
ters, then Weighted Lottery, it seems, will say that the result of a cor-
rectly proportionally weighted lottery ought to be respected, even if
the agent had failed to identify every saveable individual. When
specified in this ‘conservative’ way, though, Weighted Lottery is not
practically equivalent to Individualist Lottery after all.
IV
Weighted Lottery and Equal Moral Respect. Specified in this conserva-
tive, original-lottery-respecting way, moreover, Weighted Lottery does
not in every case respect the equal moral significance of saveable individ-
uals. Before we see why this is the case, it is necessary to say something
about what respecting individuals’ equal moral significance entails.
Suppose, first, that we are deciding which of two groups to rescue,
and that we have most reason to save the first of these groups. Now
suppose that one further person is added to each of these two
groups. If these two additional individuals are equally morally signif-
icant, then we cannot now suddenly have most reason to save the
second group. At most, we may now be required to employ a new
lottery, taking these additional individuals into account.7 But we
cannot be required to proceed directly to saving the second group.
The person added to the second group could transform our obliga-
tion in this way only if they somehow had a greater claim to be
rescued than the person added to the first group. And if these two
additional individuals are equally morally significant, then they
7 This qualification makes the principle being outlined here weaker than the ‘Balancing
Requirement’ endorsed by Kamm (2005, p. 6) and Scanlon (1998, p. 232). The Balancing
Requirement tells us that the claims of the two additional individuals balance each other
out entirely, leaving us still required to save the first group.
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have equal claims to be rescued. So if we had most reason to save
the first group before these two individuals were added, then we
cannot have most reason to save the second group immediately after
these individuals are added. Call this principle the Anti-
Transformation Requirement.
When specified in a conservative, original-lottery-respecting way,
Weighted Lottery violates the Anti-Transformation Requirement.
Consider this case:
Rocks. John sees three people stranded on rocks in the sea, about to
drown. On the first rock, he sees one person; on the second, he sees two
people. John is able to save only one of these two groups from drowning.
P P    P
Following Weighted Lottery, John runs a proportionally weighted
lottery to determine which group to save, offering the person on the
first rock a 1/3 chance of rescue, and the two people on the second
rock a 2/3 chance. The first-rock person wins this lottery, so John
swims towards the first rock.
Before he reaches it, John realizes that there is a third person on the
second rock that he had previously failed to see:
P P    P    P
Again following Weighted Lottery, John runs a new lottery to deter-
mine which group to save, offering the first-rock person a 1=4 chance of
rescue, and the second-rock group of three a 3=4 chance. The second-
rock groups wins this lottery, so John swims towards the second rock.
As he does so, John realizes that there is a second person on the first
rock that he had failed to notice, and a fourth person on the second rock:
P    P P    P    P    P
John still has time to swim to either rock or run another lottery.
Specified as we are supposing here, Weighted Lottery now requires
John to swim back to the first rock and save the two people there.
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When John ran his first lottery, he was mistaken about the total
number of people he was able to save: he believed there to be three
people that he could save, when, in fact, there were six. But he was
not mistaken about the proportion of this number that were in each
group. Seeing one person on the first rock, and two people on the
second rock, John believed that a third of the saveable individuals
were on the first rock, with two-thirds of them on the second rock.
And this belief was correct: of the six people that he was actually
able to save, two of them were on the first rock, while four of them
were on the second rock. John’s initial weighted lottery thus suc-
ceeded in offering the two groups correctly proportioned chances of
rescue after all.
This initial lottery was won by the group on the first rock. And
Weighted Lottery, as currently specified, requires John to respect the
result of a previous correctly proportionally weighted lottery. John
is thus required by Weighted Lottery to save the first-rock group,
leaving the second-rock group to die.
By requiring this of John, though, Weighted Lottery violates the
Anti-Transformation Requirement. Before discovering the final two
saveable individuals (the second person on the first rock, and the
fourth person on the second rock), Weighted Lottery requires John
to save the second-rock group. Yet, after John discovers one addi-
tional individual on the first rock, and one additional individual
on the second rock, Weighted Lottery now requires him to save the
first-rock group. John’s obligation, Weighted Lottery tells us,
has been transformed by the addition of a single individual to each
saveable group. And this, of course, is precisely what the Anti-
Transformation Requirement prohibits.
We have seen that satisfying the Anti-Transformation
Requirement is a necessary condition for respecting the equal moral
significance of saveable individuals. If Greatest Number and Equal
Chance are to be rejected on the grounds that they fail to respect ev-
ery person’s equal moral significance, therefore, Weighted Lottery is
no more promising an alternative. Considerations of respect may
lead us to think that we should not automatically save the largest
group, or employ an equal-chance lottery to determine which group
to save. Noting its promise to give every person a chance of being
rescued, but still offer higher chances to larger groups, we may then
turn to Weighted Lottery for answers. But this would be a mistake.
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These same considerations of respect should lead us away from
employing a proportionally weighted lottery.
V
Conclusion. Timmermann’s claim that Weighted Lottery and
Individualist Lottery are practically equivalent is correct only if, in
cases like the one outlined, Weighted Lottery requires agents to run
a new lottery in response to their new information. But, most plausi-
bly, Weighted Lottery does not require this. And, if it does not re-
quire this, then Weighted Lottery does not in every case respect the
equal moral significance of saveable individuals. Even if the disre-
spectfulness objection to Greatest Number and Equal Chance is suc-
cessful, Weighted Lottery offers no solution.8
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